In this paper we will discuss the design of abstract firewall model along with platform-independent policy definition language. We will also discuss the main design challenges and solutions to these challenges, as well as examine several differences in policy semantics between vendors and how it could be mapped to our platform-independent language. We will also touch upon a processing model, describing the mechanism by which an abstract policy could be compiled into a concrete firewall policy syntax.
Introduction
Presently, firewall administrators are often required to manage multiple firewall platforms from different vendors. Each of these platforms has its own language to describe firewall policies. Besides syntax differences, firewall policy models also vary from vendor to vendor. If we make a parallel to programming languages, a firewall administrator is required to learn multiple assembly languages.
One possible solution is the introduction of a high-level, platform-independent firewall policy description language which could be compiled into representations specific to particular platforms. This approach relieves the burden on firewall administrator of learning the low-level details of multiple firewall platforms. Additionally, it helps to eliminate large groups of trivial errors which a human could make during policy configuration, by allowing a user to work with higher level abstractions without being burdened by low-level policy syntax details. Having a platform-independent policy representation will also allow the user to develop a class of cross-platform tools for managing, analyzing, and validating such policies. We believe that our approach will allow administrators to increase system security by reducing the chance of human error.
The ideas described in this paper are implemented in a successful open source project called Firewall Builder [10] . It currently supports five firewall platforms and is included in major Linux distributions. Firewall Builder allows the user to create and edit policies of an abstract firewall expressed in a platform-independent language. The project provides convenient GUI for editing firewall policies. The abstract policy uses a set of provided policy compilers to compile into policy files for concrete firewall platforms. In this paper we have focused on abstract firewall models and policy compilation. We refer readers to related documents on Firewall Builder user interface [11] , API, extensibility [14] , etc. This paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we wil describe the Abstract Firewall model we are using. In section 3 we will discuss some examples of platofrm-specific differences to illustrate the kinds of problems we are solving.
Then, in section 4, we will discuss some processing techniques we have used.
Finally, in section 6 we will cover some of the possible directions of future research.
Abstract Firewall
Firewall Builder presents a user with a Synthetic Model of a firewall, in which we can combine features supported by various firewall platforms. We also made some assumtions about the semantics of some rules, which are normally also platform dependent.
When working with Firewall Builder, the user only needs to know this abstract firewall model. The user defines policy for this imagninary abstract firewall, and Firewall Builder's policy compiler translates it to the model of the concrete firewall where it will be actually deployed.
Data Model
We use an object model to represent various networking and security concepts used in configuring firewalls. User data is saved in files with .fwb using syntax described in section 2.2. Objects are organized into Libraries. Each file is a collection of such libraries. Typically there is at least one library of objects created by the user. Additionally, there is a library of standard objects provided with Firewall Builder which includes definitions of standard objects (such as a list of standard address ranges for private networks per RFC 1918[12] ). When used in a business environent, the company may supply some libraries of company-wide objects to be used by all departements.
The objects could be rougly split into several categories:
Basic Networking Objects
This category includes some basic objects representing common concepts used in Networking. Some of them are:
IPv4 Address Internet Protocol (IP) version 4 address IP Service IP service, defined by protocol number and some options like loose source rote and record route UDP Service UDP service is defined by source and destination port ranges.
TCP Service TCP service is defined by source and destination port ranges and some flags. A Firewall is a special kind of host, which will be running firewall software and could be configured using Firewall Builder. The user must specify what OS platform and firewall software they are using (some platforms allow the user to select from several firewall packages). For firewalls, the user can define a Firewall Policy and NAT Rules.
ICMP Service
Firewall Policy consists of a set of firewall rules. Each rule has a source and destination, service, interface, direction, time and an action. Rule-matching semantics will be explained in Section 2.3.
NAT Rules specify how the firewall host performs network address translation, changing sources and destinations of passing packets.
Utility Objects
Objects in these categories are various convenience objects, representing higherlevel concepts which are easy to use when describing firewall policies.
hosts, IP addresses, services and time intervals. Groups are "typed". That means that groups can contain only objects of the same type.
Syntax
The policy is expressed as an Extensive Markup Language (XML [6] ) document.
The grammar of this document is specified as a Document Type Definition (DTD) file. The DTD file for the current version is shown in Appendix A.
Each object has an unique id attribute. This attribute is used to establish references between objects.
Here are some examples, to illustrate the syntax we use. First, some simple objects:
Listing 1: Network Object " name=" M y S e r v i e " d s t r a n g e e n d=" 92 " d s t r a n g e s t a r t = " 90 " s r c r a n g e e n d=" 70 " s r c r a n g e s t a r t =" 30 " /> Now let us take a look at a firewall with a simple single-rule policy 1 , shown on listing 3. As we can see, the Firewall element includes the definition for three network interfaces and a firewall policy.
Interface definitions are expressed as Interface elements. Interface if1 is dynamic and has no static IP address associated with it. Interfaces if0 and lo0
have static IP addresses assocated with them. These IP addresses are expressed as enclosing IPv4 elements. One may wonder why interface address was not specified as an attribute. The answer is that an interface could have more than one IP address assigned to it.
The firewall policy is expressed as a Policy element, and may contain one or more PolicyRule elements. Because XML specification [6] does not guarantee element order, policy rule ordering is implicitly specified via position attrbute which defines PolicyRule absolute order within enclosing Policy element.
Direction and Action rule fields are specified via direction and action attributes of a PolicyRule. Each PolicyRule rule element contains Src, Dst, Srv, Itf, When sub-elements to specify Source, Destination, Service, Interface and Time Interval rule fields respectively. Each of these elements could contain one or more object references specifing their value.
Each of the field's matching value could optionally be made negative by specifying neg attribute. For example listing 4 demonstrates a destination which is either an object with id A or B. Adding negation as shown on listing 5 changes the meaning so that the destination must be neither A nor B.
Listing 4: Negation Example (withou negation)
<Dst n e g=" F a l s e "> <ObjectRef r e f ="A" /> <ObjectRef r e f ="B" />
</Dst>
Listing 5: Negation Example (with negation)
<Dst n e g=" True "> <ObjectRef r e f ="A" /> <ObjectRef r e f ="B" />
As we have seen, there are two major ways to express relationships between objects in the Firewall Builder XML. The first way is embedding -when one object definition is enclosed in the other object definition element. An example is an Interface embedded within a Firewall object, or a IPv4 object, embedded within an Interface object. The second method uses a reference, via the ObjectRef element. In this method, in place of the object which we are refering to, we place an ObjectRef element, which has its ref attribute set to the value of id of the object we are reffering to. We can see such references in Src and Dst elements of a PolicyRule referencing Network and UDPService objects respectively in the example above.
Processing Model
It is not sufficient to define just Data Model to be able to write a firewall policy. A data model implies certain semantics, defined as a processing model.
Processing model differs from one firewall platform to another. We will define an abstract processing model to be used when defining policies of Abstract Firewall and later on we will map it to processing models of concrete firewall platforms.
For each packet passing through a firewall, several processing stages are applied. It is optionally processed via NAT Rules and then filtered by Firewall Policy Rules. These stages can change the packet headers or even drop or reject the whole packet.
While the sequence of NAT and filtering steps varies from platform to platform in real firewalls (see section 3.4 for disuccion), in Firewall Builder's abstract firewall model, it is fixed and processing is always done in the following order:
1. Network Address Translation step is performed
Firewall Policy is applied
The packet is first matched towards all NAT rules, in the order they are defined by the user. A NAT rule "matches" if the rule original source, original destination and original service fields match the current packet and if it happens within an optional time interval specified in the rule. (any matching fields may be specified as Any -a wildcard which matches any value). A matched packet is modified by replacing its source, destination and service fields with translated source, translated destination and translated service from the rule. If some of translated source, translated destination or translated service is left empty by the user, it means that the original value of this field should be preseved. If a packet has not matched any NAT rules, it will be processed further, unchanged.
Next, the packet is matched towards all Policy rules in the order they are defined by user. For each packet the following fields are matched towards the rules:
Source packet source address (IP or data link level)
Destination packet destination address (IP or data link level)
Service packet service (One of IP, UDP, ICMP service objects.)
Interface interface via which this packet has arrived
Direction direction of the packet, in respect to the firewall (Inbound or Outbound )
Any of these field could be excluded from matching if Any wildcard is specified as the value in the rule.
Once a packet has matched one of the rules, the action specified in the rule is performed. Possible values are:
Accept the packet is permitted to pass through
Deny/Drop the packet is silently dropped
Reject the packet is rejected, notyfing the server via ICMP message For accept, deny and reject actions after the first rule is matched, the approriate action is performed and no further rule checks are performed. For accounting actions, after a counter value increase, the packet matching is continued against any remaining rules.
After all rules have been processed and no accept, deny or reject action was invoked, the default policy is applied. While the default policy could be different in underlying firewall platforms (see section 3.2 for discussion), in Firewall
Builder's abstract firewall model, the default policy is to perform a drop action on every packet.
Policy Verification and Optimization
Even before the policy is compiled to concrete firewall syntax, there is certain processing which could be done on the abstract policy model. The two main areas are verification and optimization. Having well-defined processing model and a policy expressed in a stadartized form, a generic high-level policy analysis could be performed without needing to focus on the details of firewall platform implementation.
Verification
While the XML syntax validation towards the DTD ensured that there are no syntax errors in the document, it does not catch errors in semantics.
For example, we found it useful to show users a warning when some policy rules will never be used. It is similar to unreachable code detection in programming languages. For example, let us assume there are two identical rules (with drop action), which differ only in the destination address field. The first rule has destiation address 1.2.3.4/16 while the second rule has 1.2.3.4/32. Obviously, all packets which could possibly match the second rule, will be matched by the first rule first. We call this situation "rule shadowing", saying that the first rule "shadows" the second one. We try to detect such situations and report them to the user, since they most likely signify an error in the user's policy definition.
In addition to rule shadowing, in the future we can forsee other semantic errors which can be detected and reported to the user. This is one of the areas for the future research.
Optimization
There is a cost for executing each rule in a firewall. Long policies tend to affect firewall performance. It is very beneficial to try to optimize firewall policy by combining and reshuffling rules to make it shorter and hence more efficient.
Common optimization techniques include removing unusued or redundant rules, grouping multiple rules into a single one, and in general to try to express the same policy with the fewer rules.
Platform-specific challenges
Let us examine selected examples of platform specifics on pf, iptables and ipfilter firewall platforms. All these problems are normally hidden from Firewall Builder users, because the firewall hides all these platform-specific differences from the user and generates platform-specific code to resolve these issues.
Implicit vs. Explicit Interface Specification

Default Policy
What should a firewall do with a packet which matched none of the policy rules?
Should it be allowed to pass through, or should it be discarded?
In iptables default policy is a user-configurable option.
In ipfilter packets are also passed by default, unless it is compiled with IPFILTER DEFAULT BLOCK option [7] .
In pf packets are passed by default
First vs. Last Policy Rule Matching
In typical packet filter, a packet is matched towards a list of rules. It could either match or not match each rule. If a rule is matched, it makes a decision to permit this packet (accept) or not (reject or drop). There are two common matching strategies. In the first strategy, matching occurs until the first matching rule is found. We will call it first match 2 . Another strategy is to match all rules, then make a decision based on last match. We will call this strategy last match 3 .
iptables supports only the first match strategy.
ipfilter and pf both support last match strategy by default, unless quick rule keyword was specified. This keyword intstructs the firewall to stop further matching and use results from the current match as a final decision on whenever packet should be permitted to pass.
NAT vs Firewall Rules Order
Often a firewall will perform both packet filtering and network address transla- iptables destinguish two kind of NAT rules: SNAT (source NAT) and DNAT (destination NAT). It could be said that DNAT is applied first, then packet filtering, and then SNAT.
PIX, another popular firewall platform from CISCO performs packet filtering first and then NAT.
Both ipfilter and pf perform address translation first and only then perform filtering functions. However for address ranges, support for which is facilitated by mod iprange module, negation is not suported.
Both ipfilter supports negation (at least for addresses). No group negation support is provided.
pf supports negation (at least for addresses). It also supports a limited case of group negation, when using tables. For example, the following fragment allows to pass all trafic from all addresses, except ones in the black list. 
Addrress Range Emulation
All firewalls allow the user to specify an individual IP address or CIDR block in the rules. However, sometimes it is convenient to specify an address range (from -to).
iptables permits address ranges using iprange module.
Both ipfilter and pf do not support address ranges.
Dymanic Interfaces
Oftentimes, the IP address assigned to an interface is not known at the time of the policy definition. This is common with dynamic interface, which obtains its address using DHCP or a similar protocol. Abstract Firewall Policy allows the user to implement such intefaces in policy rules, in place of source or destination addresses.
pf permits the use of inteface names in the rules, and will use current interface IP addresses at the time the rule is executed.
ipfilter is using special 0/32 notation to refer to currently assigned interface IP address.
In the case of iptables there is no way to refer to the current interface dynamically-assigned IP address in policy rules.
Abstract Policy Compilation Techniques
In this section we will briefly discuss some implementation approaches used to compile and deploy Abstract Firewall policy to a concrete firewall platform.
An abstract firewall policy needs to be compiled into policy for the concrete firewall. Usually this requires certain transformations. While overall rule data structure remains rougly the same (source, destitatio, action, etc.), a target firewall platform puts various limitations to the allowed values, and sometimes even implies slightly different semantics.
We found it convenient to perform policy transformation as a series of small steps. Each step could be viewed as a function, which takes as input a list of policy rules and outputs a modified list of such rules. Some of these transformations are quite simple and could be reused between different firewall platforms.
These transformation functions are called Rule Processors. An example of a rule processor could be one which takes a single rule with address ranges in the rule source address and converts it to a group of rules, which together perform the same function as the original rule, but each rule has a single CIDR block in a source address field.
Related Work
There is a lot of related research in this area (see [9] for a good survey on the subject).
Many approaches are concentrated on building an abstract security model, and then applying to to the firewall policies (either automated genetation or verification). Some models are using UML, some build upon RBAC model. Al-Shaer et. al [3] present good formalization of firewall rules relationships and classification of the anomalies which should be detected during policy verification.
Conclusions
In this paper we have presented in an overview form Firewall Builder's approach of corss-platform firewall management: the idea of an Abstract Firewall, the data and a processing model of such firewall. In a few examples we have shown the kind of challenges firewall adminstrators are facing when they are required to work with multiple firewall platforms.
The definition of an abstract firewall model and policy definition language is a first, enabling step which allows us to develop and apply various policy analysis and transformation techniques in a platform-independent manner. Policiy verification and optimization techniques, briefly touced upon in the section 2.4 presents many interesting research challenges and opportunities.
Firwall Builder data files could contain multiple firewalls sharing common utility objects (hosts, networks, etc.). This opens the opportunity for developing more sophisticated policy analysis tools, considering not only a single firewall but a network with several firewalls. Such a comprehensive distributed firewal model could be analyzed for inter-firewall anomalies as well as intra-firewall anomalies [3] .
In the course of the project, we started to work on a formal model of policy 1. Allow groups of unrelated objects.
--> <!ENTITY % BOOLEAN "(False|True)"> <!ENTITY % STRING "CDATA"> <!ENTITY % NUMBER "CDATA"> <!--* Supported policy rule actions: * * Accept -accept the packet, analysis terminates * * Reject -reject the packet and send ICMP 'unreachable' or * TCP RST back to sender, analysis terminates * * Deny -drop the packet, nothing is sent back to sender, * analysis terminates * * Scrub -run the packet through normalizer (see 'scrub' in * PF), continue analysis * * Return -action used internally, meaning may depend on * implementation of the policy compiler but generally * means return from the block of rules * * Skip -skip N rules down and continue analysis. Used * internally. * * Continue -do nothing, continue analysis. Used internally. * * Accounting -generate target firewall platform rule to count * the packet and continue analysis. * * Modify -edit the packet (change some header values, like * TOS bits) or mark it somehow if the kernel supports * that (e.g. target MARK in iptables) * * Tag -put a tag on the packet or mark it somehow * * Pipe -send the packet to the userland process for inspection * * Classify -classify the packet for QoS or traffic shaping * * Custom -platform-depended custom action * * Branch -branch to a subset of rules for inspection * --> <!ENTITY % ACTION "(Accept|Reject|Deny|Scrub|Return|Skip|Continue|Accounting|Modify|Tag|Pipe|Classify|Custom|Branch|Route)"> <!ENTITY % DIRECTION "(Inbound|Outbound|Both)"> <!ENTITY % IPADDRESS "CDATA"> <!ENTITY % NETMASK "CDATA"> <!ELEMENT PolicyRuleOptions (Option*)>>
